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TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT IN SOMALIA:
LESSONS LEARNED

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

JAMES M. STUTEVILLE, MAJ, USA
B.S., United States Military Academy,
West Point, New York, 1981

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

1996

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
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
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
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
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT IN SOMALIA: LESSONS LEARNED by MAJ James M. Stuteville, USA, 71 pages.

This study examines the tactical intelligence effort for Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE in Somalia from December 1992 to 31 March 1994. The doctrinal principles for intelligence support to force projection operations provide the framework for the examination of tactical intelligence support in Somalia. The doctrinal principles of intelligence support for force projection operations are: "the commander drives intelligence;" "intelligence synchronization;" "split-based operations;" "tactical tailoring;" and "broadcast dissemination." By analyzing the application of these principles in Somalia, insight was gained on the lessons learned and tactics, techniques and procedures developed.

The principles proved valid for intelligence support to Operations Other Than War (OOTW). Analysis of lessons learned revealed that changes are necessary for improved application of these principles in OOTW. Better communications equipment and more efficient use of counterintelligence personnel represent two areas of potential change. The study concludes with a series of recommendations to improve tactical intelligence support in OOTW.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to acknowledge the efforts of my thesis committee in the completion of this thesis. My committee, Mr. Les Grau, Dr. Graham Turbiville, and Lieutenant Colonel Jeri Gregory, guided me through this project with great skill and patience. I thank them sincerely for their efforts.

I owe the inspiration for this thesis to Sergeant Rich Hamilton, who served in Somalia with the Joint Task Force. His descriptions of life on the streets of Mogadishu as a counterintelligence agent motivated me to conduct the research and write this thesis.

Last, I wish to thank my wife Mary for her support and encouragement during the 9 months it took to complete this thesis. Her love and words of encouragement kept me going when I encountered obstacles.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAR	After Action Review
ACE	Analysis and Control element
ARFOR	Army Force
BOS	Battlefield Operating System
CA	Civil Affairs
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
C ³ I	Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
CCIR	Commander's Critical Information Requirements
CI	Counterintelligence
CINC	Commander in Chief
CISE	CENTCOM Intelligence Support Element
COSCOM	Corps Support Command
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DISE	Deployable Intelligence Support Element
DOD	Department of Defense
FAO	Foreign Area Officer
FM	Field Manual
HF	High Frequency
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
INTSUM	Intelligence Summary
IPB	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDISS	Joint Defense Intelligence Support System
JRTC	Joint Readiness Training Center
JTF	Joint Task Force
JULLS	Joint Universal Lessons Learned System
MARFOR	Marine Force
METT-T	Mission, Enemy, Time, Terrain and Troops
MI	Military Intelligence
MSE	Mobile Subscriber Equipment
MTOE	Modified Table of Organization and Equipment
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NIST	National Intelligence Support Team
NMJIC	National Military Joint Intelligence Center
OOTW	Operations Other Than War
PIR	Priority Intelligence Requirement
SALUTE	Size, Activity, Location, Unit, Time and Equipment
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
TACSAT	Tactical Satellite
TPFDD	Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data
TTP	Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UHF	Ultra High Frequency
UNOSOM II	United Nations Operations in Somalia II
USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command

INDEX OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

Summarized below are the U.S. military operations discussed throughout this thesis.

1. Operation RESTORE HOPE. Operation RESTORE HOPE commenced on 4 December 1992, and ended 4 May 1993. The mission of the U.S.-led Joint Task Force was to secure the Somalia area of operations for humanitarian relief operations and to return control of the humanitarian relief operations to the United Nations forces. The JTF consisted primarily of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and the 10th Mountain Division. The 13th Corps Support Command provided combat service support.

2. Operation CONTINUE HOPE. Operation CONTINUE HOPE commenced on 4 May 1993 and ended 31 March 1994, with the complete withdrawal of all United Nations forces from Somalia. The mission of the United Nations-led coalition was to provide security and humanitarian assistance to the Somali people. Elements of the 10th Mountain Division, along with a task force of Army Rangers and a task force from the 24th Infantry Division, constituted the U.S. forces during CONTINUE HOPE.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union precipitated significant changes throughout the world. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the breakup of Yugoslavia, and the resurgence of old ethnic and tribal conflicts in various countries have created an unstable environment in many regions of the world. President Clinton, in the Preface of A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement published in February 1995, states:

The end of the Cold War fundamentally changed America's security imperatives. The central security challenge of the past century -- the threat of communist expansion -- is gone. The dangers we face today are more diverse. Ethnic conflict is spreading and rogue states pose a serious danger to regional stability in many corners of the globe.¹

The U.S. Army clearly will play a major role in the United States' efforts to prevent conflict and restore order in this new security environment.

The U.S. Army, no longer focused primarily on the threat posed by the former Soviet Union, now faces many new threats in a multipolar world. The Army has turned its attention to various regional conflicts and troubled countries around the world. The Army's leadership worked to develop new missions and functions in accordance with its new role for the immediate future. As the process of developing new missions and

functions unfolded, army planners coined the term Operations Other Than War to describe military operations, such as peacekeeping and humanitarian actions. Operations Other Than War are defined in Field Manual (FM) 100-5 as "military activities during peacetime and conflict that do not necessarily involve armed clashes between two organized forces." 2

Historical Perspective

Operations Other Than War (OOTW) are not a recent phenomenon for the United States Army. One can find specific examples of OOTW involvement by the Army throughout its history. The first example occurred shortly after the American Revolution, when militias were called out to put down Shays' Rebellion in New England in 1786 and 1787. The Army's campaigns to move the various Indian tribes to their designated reservations in the late 1860s and 1870s were OOTW efforts, as were U.S. efforts to pacify the Philippines from 1899-1902. The U.S. decision to provide assistance to the Republic of Vietnam's Army in the early 1960s was another OOTW effort. These examples meet the definition of FM 100-5 for OOTW and serve as historical examples of the Army's involvement in this area.

Among the Army's most recent experiences in OOTW are those in Eastern Turkey, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti. General Gordon Sullivan, as the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, stated:

Three years ago, we had hardly heard of Rwanda, of Kigali, of Mogadishu. . . . But I will tell you, American soldiers have been there and faced the reality of what is going on in the streets of Port-Au-Prince, Cap Haitien, and Guantanamo.³

Today, other OOTW situations loom on the horizon for the Army. The Army

must plan for future OOTW missions while analyzing the missions it has completed or turned over to the United Nations for resolution.

Importance To Doctrine

The Army's development of doctrine for OOTW paralleled its increasing involvement with OOTW. In 1993, the Army updated FM 100-5, its keystone doctrinal manual for operations, to include a chapter on OOTW. FM 100-5 describes doctrine as "the statement of how America's Army, as part of a joint team, intends to conduct war and operations other than war."⁴ Doctrine evolves from the experience gained and lessons learned in previous conflicts, and is illustrated in the current FM 100-5 by historic examples which teach essential points.

Doctrine also provides a set of guidelines on how the commander uses the combat functions of intelligence, maneuver, fire support, air defense, mobility and survivability, logistics, and battle command to develop and retain combat power. These combat functions at the tactical level are known as battlefield operating systems (BOSs). There are distinct field manuals for each BOS that describe the principles and procedures for its application on the battlefield. These doctrinal principles and procedures continue to evolve, and they also apply to OOTW environments. For example, the capstone manual for the intelligence BOS FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, discusses the use of the intelligence BOS during OOTW:

During force projection operations, MI uses Intelligence BOS procedures and architecture, established during peacetime, to insure that the force commander is supported with accurate and responsive intelligence from predeployment through redeployment.⁵

Army doctrine now provides guidance on the use of the BOSs for war and OOTW.

The doctrine for the application of intelligence in a tactical environment has changed considerably since the Vietnam period. One of the lessons learned from Vietnam was that the tactical commanders did not receive timely intelligence reports. In response, the Army created a single Military Intelligence organization designed to support the tactical commander by merging the Army Security Agency and the Counterintelligence Corps. The Army eliminated the old intelligence practice of "stovepiping" intelligence and now provides timely intelligence to tactical commanders at various levels. Today, intelligence doctrine is changing again in response to the requirements of the OOTW environment. Army planners accept new doctrinal principles as they expand their operational focus and incorporate experience from the many missions conducted. An analysis of the Army's experiences in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti is critical to its future success in OOTW and to the development of new doctrine.

The Research Question and Problem Statement

This study examines the intelligence BOS in Somalia during Operation RESTORE HOPE and beyond. Specifically, it examines U.S. Army tactical intelligence during RESTORE HOPE and the subsequent United Nations Operation, to assess what tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) the U.S. Army developed. These TTP are analyzed for lessons learned, and how they are compared with current doctrine regarding tactical intelligence support in an OOTW environment.

This thesis addresses the following questions:

1. What are the primary lessons learned for tactical intelligence support to the OOTW in Somalia? 2. Should they be incorporated into intelligence doctrine?

The following secondary questions are addressed in order to answer the primary questions:

1. What are the doctrinal principles for providing tactical intelligence support to OOTW?

2. Were these doctrinal principles applied to tactical intelligence support to the OOTW in Somalia?

3. What were the problems regarding the application of these doctrinal principles in the OOTW of Somalia?

4. What were the TTP developed during this OOTW to cover doctrinal failings or gaps?

An analysis of the answers to these questions allows either a reasonable judgement that the doctrinal principles for tactical intelligence support in OOTW are sound or that specific TTP were developed to improve the application of those principles. Either result will prove useful for the application of tactical intelligence support for future OOTW.

Key Definitions

The following definitions for certain key terms are provided for reference. The following definitions of tactics, techniques and procedures are taken from FM 100-5, the Army's primary doctrinal manual on operations.

Tactics is the employment of units in combat. Techniques are the detailed methods for accomplishing a task. They are not the only way to do a task or the way a task must be done. A

procedure is a standard and detailed mode or course of action that describes how to perform a certain task.⁵

This thesis uses a slightly different definition of tactics for OOTW. Tactics is the employment of units in the specific environment posed by the OOTW. This definition is necessary due to the diverse nature of OOTW. The official definitions for techniques and procedures are suitable for this study. The definitions for operational intelligence and tactical intelligence are taken from FM 34-1, the Army's capstone manual for intelligence.

Operational intelligence supports the planning and execution of campaigns and major operations, and reflects the nature of the theater of war itself. Intelligence at this level serves as a bridge between strategic and tactical levels. . . . Tactical intelligence supports the execution of battles and engagements. It provides the tactical commander with the intelligence he needs to employ combat elements against enemy forces and achieve the objectives of the operational commander.⁷

No other definitions are required for this thesis.

Assumptions

Certain assumptions are made in this study. First is that the U.S. Army used certain doctrinal principles while providing intelligence support during Operation RESTORE HOPE and in the intelligence support provided to the United Nations Coalition Forces. These principles form the basis for the research framework, as explained in chapter 3. The second assumption is that the deployed forces developed TTP to cover doctrinal gaps for intelligence support during RESTORE HOPE.

Limitations

There is one limitation. A study of this type is limited by time. There is a wealth of unit histories, operational plans, and after-action reviews available. Many U.S. Army personnel who deployed to Somalia can be located and interviewed. However, due to time constraints, the author kept the number of official documents reviewed and soldiers interviewed to a manageable number.

Delimitations

Three research constraints made the task more manageable. First, the doctrinal principles for intelligence support in a force projection environment served as a reference framework for this study. This focused the research enough to answer the research questions and complete the project on time. A discussion of these doctrinal principles occurs in chapter 4. Second, the research for this project is limited to official documents and personal interviews. Third, the only research material used is that which is unclassified or that can be declassified for use in this study. There are no other constraints on research for this thesis.

A review of all the relevant material available at the Combined Arms Research Library, Command and General Staff College, including other theses and monographs, revealed that no other study has been conducted on this topic. There are other studies covering such topics as decision making in OOTW, doctrinal functions of intelligence in peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and operational elements of design in OOTW. Some of these related works are discussed in the literature

review in chapter 2. However, no other studies covering the topic and the associated research question chosen are known.

Significance of the Study

The purpose of this study is to conduct a comprehensive examination of the tactical intelligence support provided to the OOTW in Somalia, during Operation RESTORE HOPE and the subsequent United Nations operation CONTINUE HOPE. The study conducts an assessment of the lessons learned and an analysis of these lessons and in addition compares them to current doctrinal principles for tactical intelligence support. The analysis and conclusions provide Military Intelligence officers with lessons learned concerning tactical intelligence support in an OOTW environment. The goal is to provide a quality product that others may use to avoid the pitfalls encountered by those who have gone before.

Endnotes

¹The White House, A National Security Strategy Of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC: The White House, February 1995), i.

²U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, June 1993), glossary-6.

³U.S. Army, United States Army Posture Statement FY96 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, February 1995), 110.

⁴FM 100-5, 1-1.

⁵U.S. Army, FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 27 September 1994), 1-11.

⁶U.S. Army, FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, April 1992), 2-6.

⁷FM 34-1, 2-3.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

As noted, there are no known research projects that analyzed the level of intelligence support for Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE. As expected, the majority of the research conducted on the operations in Somalia has dealt either with the decisions made during the operations or with the interaction between U.S. Forces and the United Nations. However, there are several sources of information on tactical intelligence support in Somalia.

Four sources discuss the level of tactical intelligence support provided by the U.S. Army in Somalia. The first of these was prepared by the Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL), located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, which published the Operation RESTORE HOPE Lessons Learned Report. The report provides very specific but concise summations of the observations made by subject matter experts (SMEs) and unit participants. The CALL Team collected these observations from January to April 1993. Facets of the operation presented in this report include tactical intelligence. However, this report provides only conclusions, not the actual observations and analysis of these observations. Some of the material used by the CALL team, such as unit after action reports, is available through the Fort Leavenworth archives. This material is discussed later in this chapter. The second

source, also published by CALL, is the U.S. Army Operations In Support of UNOSOM II Lessons Learned Report. This report provides the lessons learned from the second phase in Somalia, Operation CONTINUE HOPE, which lasted from 4 May 1993 to 31 March 1994. The report contains several observations on tactical intelligence support. However, as in the first CALL report, only conclusions are presented, not actual observations and analysis. The third source, published by the National Defense University Press, is Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, written by Colonel Kenneth Allard of the Institute for National Strategic Studies. It provides a concise summary of the reports on file in the Joint Universal Lessons Learned (JULL) database for Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE. However, Colonel Allard's study focused on the operational aspects versus the tactical aspects. The fourth and final source is Operation RESTORE HOPE: A Communications and Intelligence Assessment, written by the Intelligence and Communications Architecture (INCA) Project Office. The INCA Project Office is an organization chartered by Congress to assess the Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C³I) community's efforts in improving the intelligence flow to the commanders in the field.¹ This assessment provides excellent material on the intelligence architecture for Operation RESTORE HOPE. It also contains the most comprehensive assessment of intelligence support for Operation RESTORE HOPE of any document reviewed. Each of these primary sources provided information useful for this project. However, none of them used a coherent doctrinal framework as the basis of their analysis, and the conclusions are simply stated in a matter of fact manner.

There are several additional sources that provide substantial background information. The Doctrinal Functions of Intelligence: Are They Applicable To Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Operations? a monograph written by Major Jonathan Hunter, provides doctrinal analysis of the intelligence functions. He examines the six doctrinal functions of intelligence: indications and warning, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, situation development, force protection, target development/target acquisition, and battle damage assessment. Major Hunter evaluates the merits of these doctrinal functions of intelligence in OOTW type missions. His monograph also contains several case studies comparing these functions to specific OOTW, to include Somalia. Major Hunter's conclusions regarding the doctrinal intelligence functions provide insight on the unique challenges posed by OOTW. His monograph is a "must read" for intelligence professionals and contains information useful to this study. Humanitarian Assistance and the Elements of Operational Design, a monograph written by Major Carol Clair, examines joint warfighting doctrine and its applicability to humanitarian assistance operations. It provides information on the operational intelligence goals for Operation RESTORE HOPE.

The U.S. Marine Corps prepared several lessons learned documents and journal articles concerning its participation in Somalia. The major Marine Corps document is the Operation RESTORE HOPE Collection and Lessons Learned Project Report, prepared by its Combat Development Command. It is similar in specificity and scope to the lessons learned documents prepared by CALL for the Army. This document is useful in comparing and contrasting the intelligence efforts of the Marine Corps

with the Army. Two articles from the Marine Corps Gazette, "Intelligence Lessons Known and Revealed During Operation RESTORE HOPE Somalia" and "Intelligence Support During a Humanitarian Mission," provide more depth on tactical intelligence support. These articles provide good insight into Marine Corps tactical intelligence support for Operation RESTORE HOPE, offering more details than the lessons learned document. They contain information confirming some of the Army lessons learned and are useful when comparing and contrasting intelligence support provided by the individual services.

The reports contained in the JULL database for Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE are good sources of information. The JULL database is a DOD repository for lessons learned during joint operations, such as RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE. The reports provide more detailed observations on certain facets of tactical intelligence support for operations. Many of the sources discussed in previous paragraphs used these JULL reports to support conclusions. However, there are certain research limitations to these JULL reports. Colonel Allard, in an article for the Joint Force Quarterly that discussed the use of lessons learned in the formulation of joint doctrine, writes that:

Individual JULLS reports range from the trivial to the profound; but because they lack specific context information or other corroborating data, it is often hard to judge their validity. Worse, normal personnel turbulence and lengthy processing times often make it impossible to track down those who originally submitted them.²

Therefore, if a person uses these JULLS reports, he must be prepared to conduct additional research to corroborate their validity.

There were no other sources of literature that discuss the level of tactical intelligence support for operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE.

Endnotes

¹The Intelligence and Communications Architecture (INCA) Project Office, Operation RESTORE HOPE: A Communications and Intelligence Assessment (Draft) (Washington, DC: INCA, November 1994), 4.

²C. Kenneth Allard, "Lessons Unlearned: Somalia and Joint Doctrine," Joint Force Quarterly n.s. 9 (Autumn 1995): 107-108.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Chapters 1 and 2 focused on the purpose of the study and previous research. This chapter provides the research methodology or analytical roadmap used for this study. This chapter focuses on the process used rather than the outcomes of the research, which are addressed in later chapters.

There were four distinct phases of research during this study. Each of these phases corresponds to one of the secondary research questions discussed in chapter 1. Each question and phase was addressed in sequence. Evidence gathered during each phase and the subsequent analysis of that evidence led to certain conclusions. These conclusions are the basis of the answer to the primary research question.

The first phase of research defined and discussed the doctrinal principles for providing intelligence support at the tactical level for OOTW. The doctrinal principles for intelligence support to force projection operations as outlined in FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, set out a framework for illustrating how tactical intelligence support is provided to an operation. These principles represent the foundation for providing intelligence support to any conflict or operation other than war. FM 34-1 is the capstone manual for the Military Intelligence field and was written at the same

time as the most recent version of FM 100-5. FM 34-1 provides examples that illustrate how these doctrinal principles are applied in a theoretical OOTW environment. The written product of this phase is a definition and discussion of these principles and is contained in chapter 4.

The second phase of the research examined the application of these doctrinal principles. No analysis of tactical intelligence support during Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE would be complete without showing how doctrine was applied in these operations. This analysis provided the starting point for the examination of the lessons learned from these operations and a foundation for conclusions reached concerning these lessons. This phase of the research is roughly analogous to the conduct of intelligence preparation of the battlefield. A planner must understand enemy doctrine before using other situational factors to develop a template showing the enemy's probable courses of action. This project essentially followed the same process. Doctrine is defined in phase one, and the application of doctrine in a situational environment (i.e., Somalia) is reviewed in phase two. After-action reports and other assessments of the intelligence effort in Somalia provided the source material for this phase. Completion of this phase resulted in an appreciation of the actual application of the doctrinal principles for tactical intelligence support in Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE. These results are documented in the second half of chapter 4.

The third phase of this thesis is a comprehensive examination of intelligence support mistakes and the lessons learned for Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE. Various after action reports, lessons-

learned documents, JULLS reports, and other assessments provided the basis for a compilation of these mistakes and lessons learned. If there were apparent information gaps in the material, a check of additional sources insured that these gaps were not due to an omission of information in the original source material. Following the collection of all the material relevant to this phase, an analysis determined why the mistakes were made and what corrective actions were needed to prevent their occurrence in future OOTW. The conclusions led to the recommendations concerning which tactics, techniques, and procedures need to be modified and incorporated into doctrine. The documentation of the analysis and the recommended TTPs are contained in chapter 5 of this paper.

A subjective evaluation of the evidence determined its relevance and validity to the research question. Any information or evidence that did not fit the parameters of this thesis was discarded. Criteria must be established for evaluating evidence. There is difficulty in defining these criteria because the evidence to be evaluated was subjective rather than objective. No quantitative methods for evaluating evidence can be used because the evidence does not involve numbers. Each piece of evidence has to be evaluated on its own merit. Therefore, the following criteria were used to evaluate evidence. First, the evidence was checked to see if it met the parameters of the doctrinal principles. If it had any connection to the doctrinal principles, it was retained. Second, each piece of evidence was assessed on its applicability as a tactic, technique, or procedure and, if so, if the specific TTP represented a solution to a specific problem identified during the

research. The final phase of evaluation compared each piece of evidence to an established TTP used in the tactical intelligence arena. These established TTPs are those commonly used by intelligence units. The goal was to screen out those TTP used in Somalia that were already incorporated in intelligence doctrine. If specific TTP were used during these operations that represent common practices for intelligence support, then the U.S. Army's failure to use the established TTP was documented. No further recommendation of these TTP was needed as they were already included in doctrine. Once these criteria were applied to the evidence, the results of the evaluation were the recommendations of which TTP should be incorporated into doctrine. The bottomline was that for a specific TTP to be recommended at the conclusion of this project, it had to represent an improved way to do business. These criteria allowed for a comprehensive evaluation of the evidence collected.

All research has potential problems that need to be understood and avoided or dealt with. The first potential problem is the bias that the author might have as a Military Intelligence professional. Negative observations regarding tactical intelligence support should not interfere with objectivity and analysis of the evidence. The way to avoid this bias is to conduct thorough research and let the overwhelming facts speak for themselves.

A second potential problem is centered on how the conclusions are developed. That is, conclusions drawn must be derived from a fresh analysis of facts, rather than official positions and recommendations. While lessons learned reports may contain much pertinent information,

they must be considered in light of additional sources. Comprehensive research helped to reach this goal.

Two major techniques were used to gather evidence in accordance with the phases discussed earlier in this chapter. The first technique consisted of document collection and review. As discussed in chapter 2, there are a variety of sources that contain information relating to the topic. The majority of the documentation was from official sources, such as the Center for Army Lessons Learned or CALL. While this information provided a good starting point, additional material came from other documents from several different agencies. The second technique the conduct of personal and telephonic interviews provided additional information to fill a gap or clarify collected information. The people interviewed had served in Somalia. The combination of document collection and selected personal interviews supported a comprehensive research effort.

The research methodology outlined the different phases to be conducted and provided the endstates for each phase. Once the research was completed, it provided criteria for evaluation of the evidence. Evidence was evaluated and analyzed, leading to development of conclusions and recommendations. Finally, areas of additional study identified during the project were summarized and presented. The results of the research are documented in the following chapters. Chapter 4 contains an examination of doctrine and the application of the doctrine. Chapter 5 contains the analysis of mistakes made and lessons learned. Chapter 6 presents recommendations and conclusions.

CHAPTER 4

DOCTRINE

Evaluation of the lessons learned regarding tactical intelligence support during Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE is based on an understanding of the doctrinal principles for intelligence support. As stated in chapter 3, the doctrinal principles are taken from FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations. These principles are: the commander drives intelligence, intelligence synchronization, split-based operations, tactical tailoring, and broadcast dissemination. The diagram in figure 1 on the next page, illustrates them. The MI component in the diagram is the military intelligence assets of the U.S. Army. Each of the principles illustrated in figure 1 is examined in detail.

The most important of these principles is "the commander drives intelligence." This principle states that the commander's participation in the intelligence process is crucial for the success of the mission. The commander must focus his intelligence assets for the mission. He must understand the intelligence battlefield operating system (BOS), its capabilities and limitations, and exploit it to the maximum extent possible. The commander must also ensure that the intelligence system focuses on the intelligence requirements he deems crucial to the mission. He should also ensure that the intelligence system supports his subordinate units' intelligence requirements, and he must adjudicate




Figure 1. Principles of Force Projection Intelligence Operations.
Source: U.S. Army, FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 27 September 1994), 1-4.

when conflicts arise.¹ General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., Commander of the VII Corps during Operation DESERT STORM, writes that:

Commanders must focus intelligence. They must decide what they need to know for the operation to succeed. This includes establishing clear priorities for intelligence and targets. My goal was to limit my questions to six.²

The other four doctrinal principles for force projection operations support the principle that "the commander drives intelligence," the importance of which cannot be overstated.

The second doctrinal principle, "intelligence synchronization," is closely tied to the first. Intelligence synchronization means

linking the intelligence system to the commander's concept of the operation. It requires coordinating the intelligence effort to provide the intelligence the commander needs to make decisions and direct operations. Intelligence synchronization requires that all collection efforts be tied to the commander's intelligence requirements and not wasted on less important requirements. It is a continuous process designed to keep the commander aware of the enemy battlefield situation.³ An example of the application of the principle of intelligence synchronization is the deployment of a collection system to observe a specific enemy avenue of approach. If the collection system detects significant enemy movement, then the commander would have the necessary information to commit forces to defeat the enemy. The synchronization of intelligence systems to the commander's requirements provides him with the maximum information about the enemy. The great Chinese warrior and philosopher Sun-Tzu distilled the principle in this way: "If you know the enemy and know yourself; you need not fear the result of a hundred battles."⁴ Successful intelligence synchronization provides the commander with the knowledge of the enemy.

The third doctrinal principle, "split-based operations," is closely related to the principle of war known as economy of force. Economy of force, as defined in FM 100-5, Operations, requires a commander to "employ all combat power available in the most effective way possible."⁵ The principle of split-based operations--*** calls for the most effective use of all intelligence assets to support the mission. Following this principle, the commander deploys a small, tailored intelligence element with the initial combat elements into a

theater of operations. The deployed intelligence element is supported by the intelligence personnel and assets from its home station. The home station intelligence element requests that national intelligence systems collect intelligence to support the specific contingency, and then provides that intelligence to its deployed element. This principle relies on good communications and dissemination systems to "push" the intelligence to the deployed element in the theater of operations. The deployed intelligence element, after receiving the intelligence, uses computer systems to fuse the intelligence into products that support the commander. As a contingency develops, additional intelligence assets deploy to the theater, thus reducing the level of intelligence support provided from the home station.⁶ Certain national level intelligence is still provided to the deployed element by the home station intelligence element, but operational and tactical level intelligence come from assets on the ground.

The Army intelligence community created the deployable intelligence support element (DISE) to support the principle of split-based operations. The purpose of the DISE is to provide commanders with a small, tactically tailored, highly mobile intelligence support element that could deploy quickly with the initial entry force. The DISE has the communications, automated processing systems and broadcast downlinks necessary to receive and fuse intelligence to support the theater commander.⁷ The DISE, being tactically tailored, can support any type of mission, making it an ideal organization for the OOTW environment. This concept of tailoring the force to the specific contingency has other applications.

The fourth doctrinal principle is "tactical tailoring." This principle is based on the premise that each contingency is different, requiring specific capabilities in the deployed force structure. The force required for Rwanda differed from the force required in Somalia due to the differences in mission. Prior to the end of the Cold War, this principle was not as important because U.S. forces were primarily structured to fight against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Today, the Army must be prepared to react to a number of diverse contingencies. As a result, the principle of "tactical tailoring" is now more important.

To use tactical tailoring, the commander must consider the factors of the mission assigned, the enemy threat, the troops available, the terrain and weather in the theater, and the time available (METT-T). He uses these elements to assess the mission requirements, including the intelligence assets he will need. He also considers the possibility of collecting certain intelligence information from outside the theater, as this will reduce the size of the deployable intelligence element. To further tailor his intelligence force, the commander must insure that the deployable intelligence element will be able to provide accurate and responsive intelligence. The commander must also insure that the deployable package is mobile, sustainable and that it is integrated into the deployment flow early enough to get it to the theater in a timely manner.⁸ To accomplish the analysis needed for tactical tailoring, the commander and his staff must develop the plans and identify the requisite force structure for all assigned contingencies ahead of time. This insures that they have a foundation established for each mission,

and then they adjust accordingly when the contingencies occur. The principle of tactical tailoring flows down to the subordinate intelligence units in the form of the plans and the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). This principle provides the maximum amount of flexibility and efficiency for every mission assigned to a unit.

The fifth doctrinal principle of intelligence operations is "broadcast dissemination." This principle insures that commanders at multiple echelons receive a common intelligence picture of the battlefield. To do this, planners discarded the old method of intelligence flowing down the pipeline from one echelon to the next echelon. Now, using improved communications technology and automation systems, intelligence is pushed simultaneously to the commanders at many echelons. Broadcast dissemination eliminates the bottlenecks that used to exist within point-to-point intelligence dissemination channels. It also reduces the number of personnel and intelligence collection systems needed to support commanders at different echelons. Intelligence from each of the disciplines, such as signals, imagery and human intelligence, can be disseminated using this principle.⁹ To support this principle, the army intelligence community developed the analysis and control element (ACE), and integrated it into the force structure from brigade to the theater army level. The ACE is the intelligence element responsible for collecting all the intelligence flowing into the various terminals as a result of broadcast dissemination. It synthesizes the intelligence to provide commanders with the intelligence picture of the battlefield.¹⁰ Because the ACE is located at various echelons, each commander at the respective echelon receives the current

picture of the enemy situation for his area of operations. This is an application of the principle of broadcast dissemination.

The examination of these doctrinal principles for intelligence is crucial to the evaluation of tactical intelligence support for Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE. The first question is, What are the fundamental doctrinal principles for intelligence support in an OOTW environment? The doctrinal principles for intelligence support to force projection operations were selected because they answer this question. Force projection, as defined in FM 100-5 Operations, is

the movement of [military] forces from CONUS or a theater in response to requirements of war or operations other than war. Force-projection operations extend from mobilization and deployment of forces, to redeployment to CONUS or home theater, to subsequent demobilization.¹¹

Force projection operations represent the majority of the OOTW that the Army will encounter in the future. The operations in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti were representative of force projection operations.

Therefore, it is logical to select the doctrinal principles for intelligence support to force projection operations from FM 34-1 Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations. These principles provide a good framework with which to evaluate the level of tactical intelligence support to the operations in Somalia.

The U.S. Army's involvement in Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE provides a test of how these principles were applied. U.S. Army involvement in Somalia began when President Bush ordered U.S. Forces to Somalia to support the U.N. humanitarian relief operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued a warning order to the Commander of the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) directing him to execute

Operation RESTORE HOPE. Operation RESTORE HOPE commenced on 4 December 1992, when Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia published the operations plan. The JTF consisted of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (IMEF), the 10th Mountain Division, and the 13th Corps Support Command (COSCOM). The Commander IMEF, Lieutenant General (LTG) Johnston, was the Commander of JTF Somalia. The JTF's mission was to secure the area of operations for humanitarian relief operations and return control of the humanitarian relief operations to the United Nations forces.¹²

The Army Forces (ARFOR), primarily from the 10th Mountain Division, were alerted on 1 December 1992 and deployed to Somalia in late December 1992, as part of JTF Somalia. A Marine Expeditionary Unit secured the Mogadishu, Somalia, air and sea ports on 9 December 1992, providing a secure area for the ARFOR to deploy into. Major General (MG) Arnold, Commanding General of the 10th Mountain Division and Commander of the ARFOR, arrived in Mogadishu on 22 December 1992. By 10 January 1993, the 10th Mountain Division completed its deployment into Somalia for Operation RESTORE HOPE.¹³

Operation RESTORE HOPE ended on 4 May 1993, when JTF Somalia came under the command of the United Nations and Lieutenant General Bir, a Turkish Officer. The new operation CONTINUE HOPE began on the same day.¹⁴ Elements of the 10th Mountain Division, in reinforced brigade strength, along with combat service support units, constituted the ARFOR during Operation CONTINUE HOPE. A task force of Army Rangers and a mechanized task force from the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) also were stationed in Somalia during this operation. The 10th Mountain Division had elements assigned to JTF Somalia and to the United Nations

forces, named United Nations Somalia II (UNOSOM II), for the duration of both operations. Operation CONTINUE HOPE ended on 31 March 1994, with the complete withdrawal of all United Nations forces.

Turning to the application of the principles for intelligence support to force projection, it is apparent that the first principle, "the commander drives intelligence," was crucial to the success of both operations. The commander must insure that the intelligence collection systems are focused to provide him the intelligence he needs for mission accomplishment. The first element to examine is the command structure and the intelligence requirements of its commander. As noted, the first JTF Commander was the Commander, IMEF, LTG Johnston while the ARFOR Commander was MG Arnold, Commander of the 10th Mountain Division. The initial commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) were designated by the JTF Commander and disseminated to the forces by the JTF J-3. CCIRs, as defined by FM 34-1 Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, are "the information the commander needs to visualize the outcome of current operations. . . . CCIRs include information on both friendly and threat forces."¹⁵ The CCIRs for Operation RESTORE HOPE were: (1) Locating the heavy weapons of all the factions in the area of responsibility; (2) determining the probable courses of action for key military/political leaders involved in the region; (3) discovering potential threats to coalition members both internal and external to Somalia actors; and (4) locating minefields.¹⁶ The CCIRs were disseminated to the lowest level so that any information could be collected and forwarded through channels to the JTF J-2. These CCIRs remained in place throughout Operation RESTORE HOPE. Subordinate

commanders also developed CCIRs that complemented the JTF Commander's CCIRs or were necessary for other specified missions. Several of these CCIRs are provided in chapter 5.

While the command structure remained unchanged and relatively uncomplicated during operation RESTORE HOPE, the same could not be said about Operation CONTINUE HOPE. Operation RESTORE HOPE was a U.S. led effort while Operation CONTINUE HOPE was a United Nations undertaking. LTG Bir, as discussed earlier, was the Commander, United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II) from 4 May 1993 to 31 March 1994. His deputy was a U.S. officer MG Montgomery, who also functioned as the Commander, U.S. Forces, Somalia, during UNOSOM II. This command structure caused some major problems regarding the application of the principle that the "commander drives intelligence." U.S. federal law prohibits the control of intelligence assets by other than U.S. personnel and prohibits the dissemination of intelligence through any intelligence channel that is not U.S. controlled. Therefore, the CENTCOM Intelligence Support Element (CISE), which provided the bulk of the intelligence support during Operation CONTINUE HOPE, could not directly support the Commander, UNOSOM II or his deputy, MG Montgomery. The CISE functioned in a general support role for the entire theater, rather than specifically for the commander.¹⁷ Several methods were developed to address this problem, ensuring that intelligence support for the Commander, UNOSOM II, was provided. These methods and the pros and cons of each will be discussed in chapter 5. However, it is clear that the Commander for Operation CONTINUE HOPE was not able to apply the

principle of the commander drives intelligence, as he was prohibited from focusing the intelligence effort.

The second doctrinal principle, "intelligence synchronization," is closely tied to the first. Intelligence synchronization, as noted above, means linking the intelligence system to the commander's concept of the operation. The CCIRs developed by the JTF Commander for Operation RESTORE HOPE were the requirements that the JTF J-2 had to fulfill. During Operation RESTORE HOPE, the JTF J-2 served as the coordinator for all intelligence efforts. The intelligence structure developed by the CENTCOM J-2 during deployment planning included four intelligence groups which provided intelligence from the tactical level to the national level. The first was a National Intelligence Support Team, or NIST, which accompanied the JTF into Somalia. The NIST team provided national-level intelligence to the JTF. The second group was the CENTCOM Intelligence Support Element (CISE), which provided theater-level intelligence to the JTF J-2. The third group was the JTF J-2 section, which synthesized the intelligence received from the NIST, the CISE and tactical level intelligence into a comprehensive intelligence picture of the situation for the JTF Commander. The fourth group contained army and marine corps intelligence units, which provided tactical-level intelligence to the JTF J-2. The JTF J-2 was responsible for synchronizing these assets to provide timely intelligence that supported the commander's concept of operations.¹⁸ The J-2, responsible for intelligence synchronization for the JTF, ensured that all intelligence support focused on the CCIRs. These levels of intelligence support remained the same during CONTINUE HOPE except that army tactical

intelligence units provided the tactical intelligence after the Marine Corps units departed. While the overall plan for intelligence support was sound, there were problems with the intelligence support provided by the different groups. These problems are discussed chapter 5.

Adequate communications are crucial when implementing the principle of "split-based operations." During a deployment, a small, tailored intelligence element accompanies the initial combat elements into a theater of operations. The intelligence personnel and assets from its home station support the deployed intelligence element. Split-based operations allows for the most effective use of intelligence assets to support the mission. The ARFOR G-2 employed this principle during the initial phases of Operation RESTORE HOPE and continued to do so for the duration of Operation CONTINUE HOPE. Initially he deployed only 15 members of his 67 member G-2 staff from Fort Drum, New York to Somalia.¹⁹ The remaining 42 soldiers on his G-2 staff functioned effectively as a research and analysis element at Fort Drum for the deployed element in Mogadishu. To do this, the two elements had to be able to communicate quickly using the Trojan SPIRIT, a dedicated intelligence communications system. The deployed element transferred and received information, data and secondary imagery over Trojan SPIRIT. It also has a secure voice and data link capability using the STU-III, a classified telephone network. The ARFOR's Trojan SPIRIT also had the Joint Defense Intelligence Support System (JDISS) emulation software, allowing JDISS transmissions of intelligence data and imagery products via commercial satellite. JDISS provided the deployed ARFOR G-2 element with the ability to communicate with their home station, the Defense

Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC), and with the JTF, which was not collocated with the ARFOR G-2.²⁰ The Trojan SPIRIT was also a backup communications system for the JTF. Trojan SPIRIT has its own transportation, satellite communications system and power generator and needs no external support. Implementing the split-based operations principle depends on a reliable communications system. The Trojan SPIRIT system filled this need very well.

The deployable intelligence support element was a part of the split-based intelligence support to Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE. While the ARFOR G-2 deployed a small deployable intelligence element to support the ARFOR, CENTCOM also deployed the CENTCOM intelligence support element (CISE). The CISE is a small, tactically tailored, highly mobile intelligence support element that deploys quickly with the initial entry force. It has the communications, automated processing systems and broadcast downlinks, necessary to receive and synthesize intelligence to support the theater commander. The Trojan SPIRIT and JDISS systems were key to the CISE being able to receive and transfer information worldwide. The national intelligence support team (NIST) was also part of the CISE and assisted with the transmission of national level intelligence. The CENTCOM J-2 staff in Florida supported the CISE much like the ARFOR G-2 supported its deployed element. While there were some lessons learned regarding split-based operations, the principle was upheld during Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE.

"Tactical tailoring," as applied during Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE, was a rather complex issue due to the situation in Somalia. This principle is based on the premise that each contingency is different, requiring specific capabilities in the deployed force structure. The commander uses the factors of METT-T to determine the ideal mix of forces for the contingency. The ARFOR G-2 also used this principle to select the proper mix of intelligence personnel for the deployable G-2 section and other division intelligence assets. He designed an effective personnel mix which allowed for collection, dissemination, information management and human intelligence (HUMINT) operations during the initial stages of the operation.²¹ The G-2 faced several restrictions which affected his choices concerning personnel and equipment. Besides the factors of METT-T, there was also a restriction on the number of personnel and associated equipment that could be deployed. The restriction was imposed by the amount of infrastructure needed in Somalia, as there was very little infrastructure on the ground. The number of personnel and types of equipment were restricted to that which could be supported by the logistic support elements.²² The G-2 tailored his deploying intelligence element based on the METT-T factors and the restrictions. As a result, the mix of personnel and equipment deployed to Somalia was initially insufficient to support Operation RESTORE HOPE. Most of the problems were corrected by the commencement of CONTINUE HOPE. The majority of the problems with tactical tailoring can be traced to a lack of accurate information on the factors of METT-T. This lack of accurate information was due to the deteriorating situation in Somalia and the fact that Somalia was not a

high priority country for intelligence collection. The information supporting METT-T must be accurate and timely in order to apply the principle of tactical tailoring correctly.

The principle of "broadcast dissemination" is as dependent on communication systems as the principle of "split-based operations." Broadcast dissemination insures that commanders at multiple echelons receive a common intelligence picture of the situation for their area of operations. Using improved technology for communications and automation systems, intelligence is now pushed to the commanders at many echelons in the field simultaneously. Nowhere was this principle more important than during Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE. There were different echelons of command as well as coalition forces in the theater. Broadcast dissemination also depended on the Trojan SPIRIT system. The JDISS terminals and Trojan SPIRIT systems using JDISS emulation software were the backbone of the intelligence dissemination network. There were JDISS terminals at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, at the JTF Headquarters in Mogadishu, and at each of the MARFOR and ARFOR Brigades. These elements could receive intelligence, including imagery, via these terminals from national and theater level intelligence agencies. The U.S. Mission to the U.N. sanitized the disseminated intelligence and then passed it to the designated U.N. Representative in Somalia.²³ Other communications systems disseminated intelligence including tactical satellite communications systems and mobile subscriber equipment (MSE). Broadcast dissemination depends on the amount and capabilities of the various communication systems available. Several problems occurred as a result of the distances

between army units, as these distances often exceeded the normal area for a division sized unit. There were also problems caused by the lack of established intelligence dissemination procedures between the coalition forces and the U.S. forces. These problems are discussed in chapter 5. However, the principle of broadcast dissemination was applied successfully by the intelligence community, proving that it has merit in force projection operations.

This chapter addressed the following research questions: What are the doctrinal principles guiding tactical intelligence support to OOTW? Were the doctrinal principles applied to tactical intelligence support in Somalia? This chapter has focused on the intelligence support doctrine and its application in force projection Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE. The following principles were examined: "the commander drives intelligence"; "intelligence synchronization"; "split-based operations"; "tactical tailoring"; and "broadcast dissemination." These principles are the doctrinal principles for intelligence support to force projection operations, and represent the doctrinal principles most associated with OOTW contingencies. As such, they are the doctrinal principles for providing tactical intelligence support for OOTW. Once they were defined and explained, the focus shifted to an examination of their application during Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE. This discussion and the examples presented answer the second research question concerning the use of the principles in Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE.

Intelligence support planning for Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE used the principles of intelligence support for force

projection operations. However, mistakes were made in the application of these principles. The important aspect of mistakes is the lessons learned from them, and the application of these lessons learned to future operations. The next chapter examines the lessons learned from Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE, and what tactics, techniques and procedures were developed in Somalia.

Endnotes

¹FM 34-1, 1-4 to 1-5.

²U.S. Army, FM 34-8, Combat Commander's Handbook On Intelligence (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 28 September 1992), 1-4.

³FM 34-1, 1-5 to 1-6.

⁴Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press), 84; trans. Samuel B. Griffith in U.S. Army, FM 34-8, Combat Commander's Handbook On Intelligence (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 28 September 1992), 1-5.

⁵FM 100-5, 2-5.

⁶FM 34-1, 1-6 to 1-7.

⁷U.S. Army Intelligence Center, Directorate of Combat Developments, Concepts Division, "Deployable Intelligence Support Element (DISE) Functional Concept (Draft)" (Fort Huachuca, AZ: U.S. Army Intelligence Center, 19 May 1995), 10.

⁸FM 34-1, 1-8.

⁹Ibid., 1-10.

¹⁰Ibid., 1-11.

¹¹FM 100-5, glossary-4.

¹²Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Operation RESTORE HOPE Lessons Learned Report, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Command, 15 November 1993), 1-3.

¹³Ibid., B-1 to B-5.

¹⁴Ibid., 4.

¹⁵FM 34-1, 2-17.

¹⁶Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), Operation RESTORE HOPE Collection and Lessons Learned Project Report, (Quantico, VA: MCCDC, 27 April 1993), 2-B-42.

¹⁷Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, (Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, January 1995), 75; and Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL), U.S. Army Operations In Support of UNOSOM II Lessons Learned Report, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Command, undated), I-2-8.

¹⁸INCA, Operation RESTORE HOPE: A Communications and Intelligence Assessment 4-3.

¹⁹Ibid., 5-20.

²⁰Ibid., 5-20.

²¹G-2, 10th Mountain Division, "ARFOR Staff Organization/Intelligence," Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) report no. 10771-60367.

²²INCA, Operation RESTORE HOPE: A Communications and Intelligence Assessment 4-6.

²³Ibid., 3-10.

CHAPTER 5

LESSONS LEARNED

Having reviewed the doctrinal principles for intelligence support to force projection operations and how they were applied in Somalia, the study now addresses the lessons learned. The first issue is: How well did the various commanders focus the intelligence effort? The JTF Commander for Operation RESTORE HOPE, LTG Johnston, established his commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) quickly and disseminated them throughout the JTF. The service component commanders used these CCIRs as well as their perception of the situation to develop their priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). These PIRs were used to focus their intelligence collection assets to support the JTF. An example of these PIRs is the one developed by the Commander, 507th Corps Support Group, the major logistical command during Operation CONTINUE HOPE. It read: "What is the threat to UNOSOM II fixed sites?"¹ This PIR supported JTF CCIR no. 3, "discovering potential threats to coalition members both internal and external to Somalia actors," discussed in chapter 4. The end result of commanders' CCIRs and PIRs was that as the intelligence collection effort increased, the information received helped focus the conduct of the JTF operation. The MARFOR Commander, Major General C.E. Wilhelm stated that: "It's refreshing to see things in their proper order--intelligence driving

operations . . . instead of operations driving operations."² Overall, the intelligence effort was well focused by the JTF Commander during Operation RESTORE HOPE.

The same statement could not be made during Operation CONTINUE HOPE. As discussed above, LTG Bir, a Turkish national, was the UNOSOM II Commander, which created restrictions on the level of intelligence dissemination and support for a non-U.S. commander. LTG Bir could not focus the intelligence effort. Rather he could only request that certain information be collected and passed to the UNOSOM II staff. By U.N. rules, U.N. forces are prohibited from collecting intelligence, but realize that forces cannot function without knowing the enemy; therefore, U.N. forces collect "information." UNOSOM II personnel collected information vital to the success of CONTINUE HOPE. However, because the whole coalition structure was based on cooperation rather than command, LTG Bir could not focus the intelligence effort as LTG Johnston had for Operation RESTORE HOPE. The partial solution to the problem was that the U.S. forces under UNOSOM II focused their collection efforts much like the ARFOR had during Operation RESTORE HOPE. They passed timely intelligence that related to UNOSOM II operations through U.S. liaison officers on the UNOSOM II staff, thus keeping LTG Bir apprised of the situation in his area of operations.³ This comparison of the respective commanders' roles in focusing the intelligence effort shows that these problems in a coalition command do exist.

The second problem regarding the commander driving intelligence during Operation CONTINUE HOPE was one created by U.S. law. The CENTCOM

Intelligence Support Element (CISE) was deployed to Somalia to provide the bulk of the intelligence analysis and fusion for the U.S. forces. It supported the U.S. JTF with intelligence support during Operation CONTINUE HOPE, but did not work directly for the JTF Commander since the Commander, U.S. Forces Somalia (COMFORSOM), was Major General Montgomery, LTG Bir's deputy. MG Montgomery's connection with UNOSOM II prevented placement of the CISE under his command, due to the U.S. law prohibiting intelligence assets being placed under a non-U.S. chain of command. Therefore, the CISE remained under the control of CENTCOM Headquarters in MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JTF did not have an adequate intelligence analysis and production capability, so it relied on the CISE. On those specific occasions when CENTCOM determined CISE priorities rather than the JTF, the JTF lost intelligence analysis and production.⁴

There are two major lessons learned from this analysis of the commanders' effort to drive intelligence during Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE. First, regardless of the command structure, U.S. commanders must focus the intelligence effort in OOTW situations. The tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for focusing intelligence support are different for a U.S.-led operations versus a coalition-led operation. The development of good CCIRs early in the operation allows subordinate commanders to focus all their intelligence assets on collecting against these CCIRs. However, in a coalition which works through cooperation rather than command, liaison teams ensure the successful coordination of intelligence or "information" collection efforts among all coalition partners. One TTP the CISE developed was to

maintain an intelligence liaison team in the UNOSOM II U-2 section to assist in the communication of intelligence requirements and intelligence dissemination. The mission of the team was to insure that LTG Bir's intelligence requirements were passed to the JTF J-2 and the CISE; the team also received intelligence information from the CISE and the JTF J-2, sanitized it, and passed it to the U-2 staff.⁵ The use of liaison teams to coordinate the collecting and sharing of intelligence and information needs to become a required procedure during coalition operations such as Operation CONTINUE HOPE.

The second lesson learned from the analysis of the commanders' role in focusing the intelligence effort is that all intelligence agencies in a theater must work for the theater commander. The fact that the CISE provided general support to the JTF Commander but actually took its orders from the CENTCOM Commander is a violation of the principle of unity of effort. The result was that all intelligence assets were not always focused on answering the intelligence requirements for the JTF Commander in Somalia. Unity of effort is a principle of Operations Other Than War, and requires that all resources work toward a common purpose.⁶ To prevent this dilution of effort in future force projection operations, all intelligence assets in the theater must be controlled by the theater commander. When the Commander, U.S. Forces is also a senior member of the coalition command, as MG Montgomery was, then a designated service component commander should control the intelligence assets in theater. This would allow the intelligence effort to proceed without violating federal law. For future force projection operations, the senior commander must focus the intelligence effort and the operational intelligence assets that collect

the intelligence to meet his requirements. The commander who focuses his intelligence effort at the operational level allows his tactical level commanders to accomplish the same.

The second principle of intelligence synchronization links intelligence collection to the commander's intelligence requirements and delivers intelligence in time to support his decision cycle. As discussed in chapter 4, the JTF J-2 was the person responsible for synchronizing the intelligence operation throughout the JTF. He and his staff, given the CCIRs, utilized all intelligence assets to collect and deliver the intelligence to the commander in a timely manner.

Several mistakes were made during the intelligence synchronization process due to the unique situation in Somalia. The threat environment in Somalia was unique because there were no standing armies. Instead, there were a number of diverse elements fighting each other armed with a variety of weaponry. U.S. intelligence personnel faced a threat for which they were not prepared. They had to establish a baseline intelligence estimate of the situation prior to starting intelligence collection. They used the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process to establish an initial estimate of the threat and possible threat courses of action. The IPB process, designed for conventional war, was a fairly rigid process which produced probable enemy dispositions and courses of action. It used these probable enemy courses of action, combined with factors, such as enemy command personalities, to produce conclusions about probable enemy intentions. However, the unique threat environment in Somalia dictated adjustments to the IPB process. Rather than relying on prepared order of battle

products and established signal intelligence profiles, analysts worked with political questions, such as "what group or faction was most influential; how can the people be made to support the operation?"⁷ To answer these types of questions, analysts adjusted and adopted the analytical techniques normally associated with counterintelligence (CI) and human intelligence (HUMINT). The analytical techniques included the use of association matrices and time-event charting. Analysts made these adjustments once they gained a working knowledge of these different techniques.

The second mistake made during the intelligence synchronization process was that intelligence personnel did not always use all intelligence collection assets fully and efficiently. They also failed to recognize potential collection assets due to their ignorance of the situation in Somalia. Many potential sources of information in Somalia did not fit the conventional definition of intelligence sources. These included such sources as the nongovernment organizations (NGOs) that were in Somalia providing humanitarian relief.⁸ Analysts eventually tasked the CI/HUMINT teams in the ARFOR to build rapport with the NGOs in order to elicit information from them. However, implementing this process was slow because intelligence collectors and analysts did not initially realize that the NGOs had information that would prove useful. The same lack of critical thinking caused intelligence collectors and analysts initially to overlook the use of the infantryman on patrol as a collection asset. To correct this thinking analysts must understand that unconventional environments like Somalia require different intelligence collection methods. All potential sources of information

should be considered, and the appropriate intelligence assets tasked to collect this information.

The ARFOR developed three TTP as possible solutions for these problems. The first was to use the CI personnel in the ARFOR to assist in the IPB process. The use of CI personnel prior to Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE in the IPB process was minimal. The IPB process, as taught at the Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, worked only for conventional war. There is no formal course at Fort Huachuca for counterintelligence analysis. The only analytical techniques course that could be applied to counterintelligence analysis was the counterterrorism course. Using CI personnel in the IPB process allowed them to introduce the analytical tools of link analysis, association matrices, and time event charting, which the majority of CI personnel know from their counterterrorism training.⁹ The use of CI personnel to assist in the analysis during the IPB phase proved an innovative technique that contributed immeasurably to the intelligence effort.

The second TTP that the ARFOR developed to improve the intelligence synchronization process was to combine the CI teams with the civil affairs (CA) teams to improve their intelligence collection potential. The CA teams were the teams that interacted with the Somali people, the NGOs and other volunteer organizations that were working the humanitarian assistance mission. The CI teams conducted several collection activities in Somalia. They conducted low-level source operations, which involved recruiting Somalis to observe and report suspicious activity. The CI teams talked to Somalis and NGO personnel

to obtain information from them. They debriefed Somalis, NGO personnel and UNOSOM II staffers to obtain information. The CI teams also screened Somali refugees and talked to those who had information. They analyzed the threat information to determine trends and patterns of enemy activity. Using the CA and CI teams in concert allowed them to complement each other. The CA teams were able to develop rapport with the people through their humanitarian assistance actions, while the CI personnel could discretely develop sources and elicit information. It took some time for the effectiveness of these CA/CI teams to develop, mainly because it took the CA teams time to build credibility with the village elders and clan leaders in Somalia. Once they established their credibility with the leaders, they were able to assist the CI teams in collecting a large amount of intelligence information in a discrete manner.¹⁰ This TTP of using the CA and CI teams together in a OOTW environment was very effective in the Somalia environment.

The ARFOR developed a third TTP during Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE which was the innovative use of checklists to improve the collection potential of patrols. Tactical units report intelligence information through the SALUTE report and routine patrol debriefings. The SALUTE Report is a standard U.S. Army format that describes the size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment for any observed enemy activity. The army uses this mechanism to report enemy or suspicious activity in a tactical environment. While many tactical units have different patrol procedures for reporting intelligence, the ARTEP standard for a reconnaissance patrol on an area reconnaissance is the SALUTE report.¹¹ However, in Somalia, the use of the SALUTE report

was not sufficient as the standard procedure for reporting intelligence information. The SALUTE report was not suitable for much of the information that was being reported. Information, like the demographics of Somalia clans, the availability of food and water, and the presence of criminal elements, was hard to report using a format that was designed for conventional warfare. The intelligence personnel in the ARFOR, at the S-2 levels and the G-2 levels, determined that a series of standardized checklists should be developed that provide a better means of reporting the information gathered by the tactical units.

The ARFOR, primarily the 10th Mountain Division, developed TTP to improve the collection of intelligence information at the tactical unit level. This TTP consisted of a series of standardized checklists for the Somalia environment, including checklists for airfield security operations, roadblocks, convoy debriefs, patrols and area assessments. They disseminated these standardized checklists to all ARFOR units: combat, combat support, and combat service support. The checklists provided small unit leaders with a resource to use to focus their efforts when conducting patrols. They also provided immediate intelligence information for the J-2 staff for current operations and local conditions. An example of these checklists, the roadblock checklist, is shown below:

- a. Report number and type of vehicles stopped. Report identifying markings and license plate numbers.
- b. Report number of passengers on the vehicle. Report age and sex of passengers.
- c. Report type and quantity of cargo.
- d. Report stated points of origin and destination of vehicle.

- e. Report stated reason for travel by passengers.
- f. Report any weapons found on vehicles.
- g. Report any sightings by passengers of weapons, technicals, or bandits during their travel.
- h. Report condition of passengers (general health, dress, attitudes).
- i. Report anything unusual reported by passengers.¹²

The information requested in these checklists was quite extensive. The use of these checklists by all units improved the accuracy and timeliness of intelligence information in the ARFOR.

The third principle, split-based operations, provided the commander on the ground in Somalia a means to synthesize national, operational and tactical level intelligence. The ARFOR G-2 section in Somalia, communicating over the Trojan SPIRIT system, received national level intelligence needed to complement its tactical intelligence assessment. It also received operational or theater level intelligence from other intelligence elements like the CISE or coalition elements during CONTINUE HOPE. The key to split-based operations is that the tactical commander can receive intelligence from other sources to fulfill his requirements when it is not available at his level. The JTF and the ARFOR made mistakes concerning the application of split-based operations, but the principle proved sound.

The mistakes, when examined, appear to have affected operational level intelligence activities more than tactical level. However, in force projection operations, the line between operational and tactical level intelligence is thin. The first mistake the ARFOR made involved Trojan SPIRIT. This system relies on satellite communications,

primarily leased commercial satellites, to communicate. ARFOR initially experienced lack of adequate satellite coverage over Somalia in RESTORE HOPE. Because Somalia was an undeveloped country, it was not a high priority for commercial satellite coverage.¹³ The 10th Mountain Division did not conduct contingency planning for Somalia until late November 1992. As a result, there was no agreement with the commercial satellite contractor to get the necessary coverage. This lack of coverage affected the ARFOR commander during the initial stages of RESTORE HOPE, when he was dependent on national level intelligence to answer his requirements while the tactical level intelligence assets were getting oriented.

The ARFOR did not make the second mistake, but rather was a victim of their higher headquarters. The ARFOR's G-2 section easily communicated with Fort Drum when the satellite coverage was finally available. They were supposed to request information and analysis from their home station to fill their intelligence collection gaps. However, their ability to request this information also meant they could provide information. As RESTORE HOPE and later, CONTINUE HOPE, progressed, the ARFOR G-2 provided more information to their home station than they received. Other ARFOR units reported the same problem. An intelligence officer with the 24th Infantry Division Task Force that deployed to Somalia in October 1993 said that the 24th Division G-2 wanted a daily intelligence summary (INTSUM), and a weekly telephonic briefing. He stated that: "We fed the 24th rather than the 24th feeding us."¹⁴ The requirement to send INTSUMs to a higher headquarters in the U.S. caused added work for a spartan intelligence structure. Split-based operations

improved the effectiveness of the deployed intelligence support elements, but also detracted from their intelligence effort.

The ARFOR developed a TTP that effectively dealt with the lack of adequate commercial satellite coverage for the Trojan SPIRIT. They directed that ARFOR units use the INMARSAT, a commercial, portable, single channel voice and data satellite communications system, as either a backup for or an alternative to the Trojan SPIRIT. The INMARSAT, an international commercial company, allowed ARFOR access to other Trojan SPIRIT terminals or the international commercial telephone network for other communications at a cost of \$10.00 a minute. The data speeds provided by INMARSAT were at the 2400 baud rate, slow for most users.¹⁵ However, the INMARSAT system fit in a briefcase, was compatible with analog modems, and was easy to operate. The ARFOR tactical units did not have the Trojan SPIRIT, but the brigade and battalion S-2s passed data from their laptop computers to the G-2 and other intelligence elements using INMARSAT.¹⁶ The combination of laptop computers and INMARSAT also allowed the CI teams deployed throughout the theater to rapidly pass intelligence reports back to the ARFOR G-2. The Army is currently fielding a laptop computer system with INMARSAT capability to all CI teams, based on the success of INMARSAT in Somalia. The INMARSAT proved to be a valuable system for intelligence personnel at the tactical and operational level.

The ARFOR units could not develop any TTP to solve the problem of the requirement to pass daily intelligence summaries and other situation reports to their higher headquarters. Commanders at all levels must recognize that the ability to conduct split-based operations using

advanced communication systems is a double-edged sword. These communication systems provide a transmission pipeline between the tactical commander on the ground and his support element at home station. The purpose is to support the tactical commander with intelligence until his organic collection assets are functioning in the theater. While commanders at higher levels need information concerning the situation on the ground, they must ensure that the passing of this information does not interfere with the original purpose of providing intelligence to the tactical commanders. Commanders must achieve a balance for the flow of information to and from the tactical commanders on the ground. The successful application of the split-based operations concept depends on this balance.

The fourth principle, tactical tailoring, provided the ARFOR Commander and his G-2 the means to match the deployed intelligence assets and personnel to the requirements of the mission. It is a simple principle in theory but complex in application. The CENTCOM Staff encountered a serious problem during the planning stage that caused problems for the tactical intelligence effort in Somalia.

The problem involved the collection of intelligence to support the planning at the strategic and operational levels. The CENTCOM Commander required information on the situation in Somalia to conduct mission planning, including information on the political, military, and economic situation in Somalia. He also needed information on the attitude of the Somali populace--and specific elements of it--toward the U.S. His logistics planners needed information on the infrastructure and port facilities in Mogadishu and other Somali cities. His J-2

needed information on the clans, their organization and equipment, and their intentions. The ARFOR G-2 needed the information on the clans so he could recommend which collection assets to deploy to Somalia. Failure to deploy the proper collection assets would affect the tactical intelligence collection effort. The CENTCOM Commander needed all this information to tailor his forces so they could accomplish their mission. This issue was summed up in the following statement from the RESTORE HOPE AAR.

The Strategic and Operational Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process failed to provide CENTCOM/JTF and ARCENT commanders the lens through which the factors of METT-T could be focused during the early stages of deployment planning.¹⁷

The failure to provide the strategic and operational intelligence on Somalia was the result of several factors. The first was the fact that intelligence collection for Somalia was low priority before the disaster relief operations began. This observation was noted in an assessment of RESTORE HOPE:

Somalia was ranked 18th out of nineteen countries on the collection priority list for USCENTCOM. As a result, intelligence analysts had to scramble to gather the intelligence to fill the existing gap.¹⁸

Second was the lack of a U.S. presence in country, to include the normal contingent of Defense Attaches. The U.S. Embassy was vacated in January 1991, when Marine helicopters evacuated all the personnel. They left because of the escalating violence in Mogadishu caused by a civil war between the Somali Government and several opposition groups.¹⁹ The lack of Defense Attaches collecting data in country contributed to the intelligence gaps.

The end result of the flawed strategic and operational intelligence preparation of the battlefield was an inaccurate picture of the Somali Theater. A memorandum from The Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to Brigadier General Maggart concerning RESTORE HOPE contained an eloquent summation of this problem.

A more accurate IPB of the AOR last fall may have profiled the societal and political environment as less hostile towards the military than originally projected--which could have changed the troop structure/force building calculus and perhaps the way the force flowed into this theater. A significant portion of the force deployed was subsequently not used or needed.²⁰

The problems discussed in the passage above caused the ARFOR to leave some equipment behind and deploy other personnel and equipment behind schedule. Some intelligence collection assets were not deployed and other personnel and equipment did not arrive in country for several weeks. This caused serious problems for the tactical intelligence effort.

The first of these problems was the ARFOR's failure to deploy signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection assets. The ARFOR intelligence units, the 110th MI Battalion (-) and the 201st MI Battalion did not deploy their ground-based SIGINT collection systems. These units had organic man-portable and vehicle-mounted tactical SIGINT collection systems. However, the ARFOR G-2 believed, based on the limited information he had for the threat in Somalia, that there was no need for SIGINT assets. There was limited space available for additional equipment due to the faulty force structure for the JTF. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) made the following observation about this decision:

tactical ground-based SIGINT was almost nonexistent. The Marines had limited assets in Mogadishu and the Army had none at all. Since Somalia had no fixed communications capability, radio was the only means of rapid, long-range communications available to warring factions, and it was a lucrative target that was not fully exploited because of the lack of tactical SIGINT collection capability in country.²¹

This shortcoming meant that the ARFOR would only receive limited SIGINT from the Marines, and had no control over the tasking of the Marine SIGINT assets.

The second problem experienced by the ARFOR involved the counterintelligence (CI) teams from the 10th Mountain Division. They did not arrive in Somalia until 6 January 1993, approximately three weeks after the G-2's collection management and dissemination cell arrived.²² Their deployment was delayed due to lack of airlift assets. They also arrived ahead of their equipment, including their vehicles, which caused further delay of their intelligence collection activities.²³ The CI teams also experienced problems concerning language. There were few Somali linguists available in the Army, so the CI teams were hindered initially in their collection efforts. The ARFOR's failure to get the CI teams in country earlier impacted on the tactical intelligence collection effort.

The third problem was the lack of a tactical level imagery collection system. The Army and Marines both have unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) that are capable of conducting near real time tactical imagery collection, day or night. However, these UAVs were not deployed to Somalia due to limited airlift assets and airspace deconfliction problems. The ARFOR's helicopter pilots were concerned that the UAVs

were a safety hazard and that they would cause problems with airspace management. The objections of the helicopter pilots was justification enough to leave the UAVs back in the U.S.²⁴

There were several TTP developed to solve a few of these problems while others remained unsolved throughout RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE. The first problem concerned the failure to deploy SIGINT assets and remained a problem throughout the operations. The TTP to solve the problem is to tailor the deploying intelligence assets tactically to provide all-source collection capability. This TTP is not new. Rather, it represents the proper application of tactical tailoring. The ARFOR G-2 should have deployed his man-portable SIGINT collection systems with the initial force. SIGINT collection assets are a valuable tool for tactical intelligence collection in OOTW environments.

The shortage of Somali linguists impeded the effectiveness of the CI teams. The U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence developed a contractual arrangement to screen, evaluate and hire linguists to support the operations in Somalia. Army counterintelligence personnel in the U.S. helped screen and evaluate linguists prior to their hiring and deployment to Somalia. These linguists worked with the CI teams for the duration of both operations, translating and providing country expertise. They did an excellent job, and one linguist lost his life in a fire fight. The author has personal knowledge of this program and the assessment of its success.

A second problem was the failure to deploy CI teams with the initial force into Somalia. This problem was due to the ARFOR's failure to recognize that human intelligence (HUMINT) information collected by

CI teams is the best source of intelligence in OOTW environments. The G-2, 10th Mountain reflected on this fortune when he noted that "This operation highlighted the need, at all levels, for a significant HUMINT collection capability inserted at the beginning of the airflow."²⁵ The TTP to solve the problem is to deploy the CI teams intact, early in the airflow, and with their full complement of equipment. They need to have organic transportation assets and long-range communication equipment. The Marine CI teams that deployed to Somalia possessed this equipment and were deployed with the initial MARFOR elements. The Marine CI teams were extremely effective as illustrated by the MARFOR Commander's comment.

There is a moral to this story: The architects of our counter-intelligence structure can take justifiable pride in the capability that has been built. The CI teams and sub-teams are populated by the right kinds of Marines - gutsy and intensely mission-oriented, but also mature and responsible. Our HUMINT collectors have again proven their worth.²⁶

An Army CI soldier who served in Somalia during CONTINUE HOPE, Sergeant Rich Hamilton, talked about the Marine CI teams in similar terms.

The Marine Corps CI teams had a noticeable advantage over Army CI teams because they always trained together and were self sufficient in a LIC [low-intensity conflict]. The Marines would unload their shop and immediately begin working. They knew exactly what was expected of each other and wasted no time asking what needed to be done.²⁷

The army intelligence community must heed the lessons learned from the Marine Corps, and insure that Army CI teams are deployed early and used effectively in OOTW environments.

The third problem concerns the use of UAVs in OOTW environments. The Army and the Marines both had UAVs with near-real-time video and forward-looking infrared radar capabilities that were capable of

locating clan demonstrations, roadblocks, mortar crews, and ambush sites. The ARFOR, due to the lack of UAVs, sent soldiers with 35mm cameras in helicopters to take aerial photographs of critical terrain and major supply routes. The use of helicopters to recon major supply routes provided the Somali clans advanced notification that the ARFOR intended to use those routes. The ARFOR usually found roadblocks on the routes after conducting reconnaissance by helicopter.²⁸ UAVs could have prevented these problems due to their forward looking infrared radar and lower profile. These UAVs were not deployed due to safety and airspace management considerations.²⁹ There were no TTP developed to address these problems. There is a need for the joint community to address the problem of airspace management for UAVs.

The ARFOR failed to apply the principle of tactical tailoring successfully as illustrated by the preceding paragraphs. Intelligence planners should insure that the deploying intelligence support element has all-source intelligence collection capability. Critical to this planning is the intelligence available for the threat force in the theater. Planners must anticipate the intelligence needs of the task force if critical threat information is not available.

The ARFOR applied the fifth principle, broadcast dissemination, successfully despite minor problems. Broadcast dissemination depends on adequate communication systems as much as split-based operations does. Trojan SPIRIT provided a reliable means of communication to receive the intelligence, and the ARFOR G-2 disseminated this intelligence to the tactical units via the mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) tactical radios. The ARFOR experienced a problem communicating using the MSE

over the long distances between units in Somalia. The average distance from Mogadishu to units in the field was approximately 375 kilometers.³⁰ The ARFOR was not equipped initially to cope with these distances, but received equipment from the JTF's communication support elements to overcome this problem.

A second problem was the dissemination of intelligence to the coalition forces via UNOSOM II headquarters. The use of liaison teams, as discussed above, was the solution to this problem. These teams received intelligence via secure telephones from the JTF J-2, sanitized it, and provided it to LTG Bir and his staff. These teams were very effective in disseminating intelligence to the coalition commander and his forces.

ARFOR worked with the JTF to solve the problem of communicating great distances with the MSE. They used high frequency (HF) and ultra high frequency (UHF) tactical satellite (TACSAT) radios to communicate over these distances. Army divisions have relatively few of the HF and UHF TACSAT radios authorized on their modified tables of organization and equipment (MTOE).³¹ The TTP to solve this problem is to increase the use of HF and UHF TACSAT radios in the division. Broadcast dissemination would improve with better long range communications at the tactical level.

ARFOR's TTP requiring use of the liaison teams to disseminate intelligence to UNOSOM II was effective. ARFOR created these teams on site to solve the problem. The TTP presents a viable solution for future coalition operations. The Army must designate and train teams for future liaison missions.

This chapter focused on the lessons learned on tactical intelligence support for Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE. This chapter answered the following questions: What were the problems regarding the application of the doctrinal principles in the OOTW of Somalia? What were the TTP developed during this OOTW to cover doctrinal failings or gaps? Discussion and examination of problems and TTPs developed to address these problems were covered in detail. Lessons were learned for future application. The next chapter presents recommendations concerning these lessons learned and areas for further study.

Endnotes

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CHAPTER 6

RECOMMENDATIONS

Having addressed doctrine and lessons learned, this study concludes with recommendations as to which TTPs should be incorporated into doctrine. The study focused on the TTPs developed during Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE for tactical intelligence support. U.S. Forces developed specific TTPs to solve problems, as discussed in chapter 5. Some of these TTPs proved to be innovative and valid for future OOTW, and are contained in the following recommendations.

The first recommendation concerns the use of designated liaison teams to maintain communications between the coalition command and the U.S. Forces. The CISE used these teams to assist with intelligence requirements and dissemination with the UNOSOM II U-2 section. The Army needs to designate these teams before contingencies occur in order to train and to equip them prior to deployment. One method to accomplish this is to assign country specific foreign area officers (FAOs) to the various Commanders in Chief (CINC) of the unified commands. These FAOs would form the foundation of the liaison teams for the CINCs and would constitute the liaison teams for contingencies in the CINC's area of operations. The Army needs these liaison teams to coordinate the

collecting and sharing of intelligence among U.S. and coalition forces in future OOTW environments.

A second recommendation involves the inclusion of CI personnel in the IPB process. CI personnel proved adept at integrating the analytical techniques of association matrices and time-event charting into the IPB process. CI personnel using these techniques contributed immeasurably to the tactical intelligence effort in Somalia. The Army needs to integrate CI personnel into analytical elements such as the analysis control element (ACE) at division and corps. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca also must develop a course to teach these analytical techniques. The majority of intelligence analysts in the Army use techniques more suited for conventional conflict. They need to learn the analytical techniques for OOTW, which are CI analytical techniques. Trained analysts will prove valuable in future OOTW situations.

The third recommendation is to have CI teams train with civil affairs (CA) teams on a regular basis. CI teams in Somalia accompanied the CA teams into the villages to gather information through observation and elicitation. This technique allowed the CI teams to develop country expertise, to build credibility, and to observe the situation throughout Somalia. These teams collected valuable intelligence as a result of their interaction with the CA teams. CI teams in divisions and corps should train on a periodic basis to develop experience and rapport. The Army needs to include scenarios at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) that require CI and CA teams to conduct missions jointly. The

TTP proved very effective in Somalia and the Army should incorporate it into doctrine.

The fourth recommendation involves the use of standardized checklists for patrols in OOTW environments. The ARFOR adopted standardized checklists to improve the intelligence collection potential of patrols. Having found the SALUTE report insufficient for reporting intelligence, the ARFOR developed a series of checklists for every mission. They developed checklists for patrols, roadblocks, convoy escort, airfield security operations, and area assessments. The Army needs to incorporate these checklists into doctrine for the units that conduct these missions. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) prepared handbooks for OOTW that includes standardized checklists and training vignettes for the use of the checklists. These checklists provide a means for the small-unit leaders to focus their intelligence collection efforts in OOTW situations.

A fifth recommendation involves the use of satellites to support intelligence "split-based operations" and "broadcast dissemination." The Army experienced a lack of commercial satellite coverage for the Somalia area of operations. The Army needs to prepare commercial contracts for satellite coverage for contingency areas that can be rapidly implemented. The Army uses satellites, such as INMARSAT, in OOTW environments for long-haul communications and long-distance tactical communications, both necessary for tactical intelligence collection and dissemination. Trojan SPIRIT also requires satellites to communicate, and it is necessary for successful application of split-based operations and broadcast dissemination.

The sixth recommendation concerns the capabilities of Army CI teams. The Army must equip CI teams with organic transportation and long-range communication assets so they can function in OOTW environments. They must operate independently throughout the area of operations and be able to communicate information rapidly and over long distances. The Army needs to develop scenarios for the JRTC that test the mettle of CI teams in OOTW situations. The CI teams conducting HUMINT collection are often the best intelligence collectors in OOTW. They proved this in Somalia and will undoubtedly prove it again in Bosnia.

Further Study

The author encountered two areas during the research that deserve further study. The first is a study of lessons learned in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti for tactical intelligence. Research conducted to examine the similarities of the lessons learned in Somalia compared to Rwanda and Haiti would be valuable. The Army needs to know if lessons learned are passed on or if the same mistakes are made in every OOTW situation.

The second area concerns the level of intelligence support at the operational level. A study examining the lessons learned for operational intelligence in Somalia would be useful. The operational intelligence effort impacts upon the level of tactical intelligence support in OOTW. There were mistakes made and lessons learned regarding operational intelligence during Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE. These need to be captured and analyzed to prevent a reoccurrence in future OOTW environments.

Summary

This study examined the tactical intelligence effort for Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE in Somalia from December 1992 to 31 March 1994. Using the doctrinal principles for intelligence support to force projection operations, the author examined the tactical intelligence effort. The explanation of these doctrinal principles and their application in Somalia was provided in chapter 4. The author conducted analysis of the mistakes made in the area of tactical intelligence, examined the lessons learned and discovered TTPs developed by the Army in Somalia. These TTPs were reviewed and compared with existing doctrine. This entire process is covered in chapter 5. The TTPs that warrant incorporation in Army doctrine are presented as recommendations in this chapter. Areas for further study are also included in this chapter.

The U.S. Army experienced many successes and some failures in Somalia during Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE. The Army learned crucial lessons regarding tactical intelligence and developed some valuable TTPs to address some of the problems encountered. The author hopes that this study will contribute to future improvements in the level of tactical intelligence support for OOTW environments.

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